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Abstract 
 
Trade unions have changed from male-dominated to majority-female organizations. We use 
linked employer-employee surveys for Norway and Britain to examine whether, in keeping 
with a median voter model, the gender shift in union membership has resulted in differential 
wage returns to unionization among men and women. In Britain, while only women receive a 
union wage premium, only men benefit from the increased bargaining power of their union 
as indicated by workplace union density. In Norway, however, both men and women receive 
a union wage premium in male-dominated workplaces; but where the union is female-
dominated, women benefit more than men. The findings suggest British unions continue to 
adopt a paternalistic attitude to representing their membership, in contrast to their more 
progressive counterparts in Norway. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Union membership has been falling for decades in much of the developed world (Schnabel, 2013), 
and collective bargaining is under threat, even in countries like Germany. However, unions continue 
to procure a wage premium for employees covered: there is little evidence of a substantial decline in 
the union wage premium, at least in the Anglophone countries where evidence is available 
(Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003, 2007). There has also been a remarkable transformation in the 
unionized workforce: unions are now often majority-female membership organizations serving 
predominantly white-collar workers, mainly in the public sector (Schnabel and Wagner, 2007). In 
Britain and Norway, which we examine in this study, density has been greater among women than 
men since the early 1990s and 2000s, respectively (Appendix Figures A1a and A1b). Union 
membership has also become increasingly educated, older, and more white-collar in both countries 
(Appendix Figure A2a and A2b).  
 Unions are voluntary, democratically-run membership organizations, so it seems reasonable 
to assume that representatives will aggregate their members' preferences and seek to maximize the 
benefits accruing to the median member, as one might anticipate under a median voter model (Booth, 
1994). The dominant model used to examine union effects on wages is the monopoly model under 
which unions monopolize the supply of labour to an employer in order to maximize the union's 
bargaining power (Hicks, 1932). The median voter model can be accommodated in this setting. The 
shift in unions' membership base means that the median voter is increasingly likely to be a woman. 
We therefore hypothesize that women are increasingly likely to benefit from union bargaining 
behaviour. 
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 There is a contrary view which sees unions as hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations, with a 
separation between the interests of union functionaries and the rank-and-file membership (Dunlop, 
1944; Pemberton, 1988). This issue is particularly acute in the case of women. First, union 
representatives tend to reflect the demographics of past cohorts of members who were predominantly 
male and white. Second, women face particular problems in receiving adequate representation by their 
union because the jobs they undertake and the employers they work for are often among the most 
difficult to reach: they are more likely than men to work on non-standard contracts on the periphery of 
the firm, experiencing more frequently periods outside the labour market and less likely to work in 
larger firms providing access to internal labour markets. (In this respect, Norway and the UK are 
comparable.) The marginal costs unions face in representing such workers are high relative to those in 
the primary sector. For these reasons it is possible that women do not benefit proportionately from 
their majority status in the union movement. 
Although the feminization of union movements in both countries, and gender segregation in 
the labour market, are similar in Britain and Norway, unions’ ability to address gender equality issues 
in the two countries may be different. First, there is much more gender inequality in the UK. It is 
ranked 25th on gender equality by the UN Development Programme, compared to Norway which is 
ranked third. Second, unions in Britain have been slow to address gender equality (Beirne and Wilson, 
2015). By contrast, gender equality issues have been high on the trade union agenda in Norway over 
recent decades. The centralized bargaining model has allowed special increments for low-wage 
groups (where women are a majority) and widespread adoption of guidelines to promote gender 
equality in company-level bargaining. This may also help secure wage increases for groups with low 
bargaining power at local level. It is plausible, therefore, that unions in Norway are more likely than 
in Britain to use their workplace bargaining power to further women's interests. Our empirical 
analysis compares these two countries where local bargaining is prevalent but differs quite markedly 
when it comes to the promotion of gender equality at local level.  
We use national population-wide register data for Norway and representative linked 
employer-employee surveys for Britain to examine whether, in keeping with a median voter model, 
the gender shift in union membership has resulted in differential wage returns to unionization among 
men and women. We start our analyses in 2004, when unionization rates of men and women in Britain 
were approximately equal, and study the changes to 2011, when women in Britain dominated unions.  
In Britain, while only women receive a membership wage premium, only men benefit from 
the increased bargaining power of their union as indicated by workplace union density. In Norway, on 
the other hand, there is no wage premium arising from individual union membership for men or 
women across workplaces as a whole. However, where the union is female-dominated women benefit 
more than men as union density rises. The findings are consistent with the proposition that British 
unions continue to adopt a paternalistic attitude to representing their membership, in contrast to their 
more progressive counterparts in Norway. 
We next describe and discuss more closely the institutional similarities and differences 
between the UK and Norway. Then we briefly review the literature on the union wage premium and 
the role of unions in tackling gender issues. After this we describe our data and outline the empirical 
approach, before presenting the results and then concluding. 
 
 
Wage-setting, bargaining and institutional differences 
 
Britain and Norway have different wage-setting regimes. The OECD (2018: 81) places the UK among 
fully decentralized collective bargaining systems, where bargaining occurs at firm or establishment 
level with little or no sectoral or government influence. In such an environment, local union density is 
a good indicator of bargaining strength (Booth, 1994), and thus will be positively correlated with 
wages. But membership declined rapidly during the 1980s and members’ characteristics also changed. 
According to Charlwood and Forth (2009: 85) ‘senior shop stewards may have become less 
representative of the wider union membership over the previous twenty-five years, rather than more 
so’, potentially undermining their ability to address gender equality issues. Dex and Forth (2009: 231) 
argue ‘unions often had their own internal struggles about taking equality seriously as the old male-
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dominated leadership and agendas had to face the reality of the growth in women’s trade union 
participation and demands. Some pioneer legal cases fought and led by women did, however, help to 
turn around union agendas.’  
Unions in Britain have since been successful in negotiating improvements in workplace 
policies and practices that have been of particular benefit to primary carers, most of whom are women 
(Bryson and Forth, 2016; Budd and Mumford, 2004). However, Kirton’s research (Healy and Kirton, 
2000; 2013; Kirton, 2006, 2015) suggests that the largely male-dominated unions are less responsive 
to women’s needs and that women face difficulties balancing union participation with other areas of 
life.  
Although Norway has among the highest union density in the world, the OECD (2018) 
classes it among the middle ground of organized decentralized and coordinated collective bargaining 
systems, a category which includes Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. In 
these countries sectoral agreements play an important role, but also leave room for bargaining at a 
lower, decentralized level. One implication is that union strength (and gender representativeness or 
lack thereof) is relevant both at firm and sector or national level. In Norway the extension of 
collective agreements is largely confined to labour immigrants (Arnholz et al., 2018).  
The 2011 British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) shows that sectoral 
collective agreements are virtually non-existent. Its 2012 Norwegian equivalent (NWERS) shows that 
85 percent of Norwegian workers have wages set through collective bargaining, but for two-thirds this 
follows partly from local bargaining (Appendix Table A1).  
Pattern bargaining is the principal coordinating mechanism in Norway (Dølvik et al., 2018): 
the internationally exposed but strongly organized metalworking sector takes the role as pattern-setter. 
Strong mechanisms for coordination, including powerful confederations and tripartite institutions, 
underpin the model (Alsos et al., 2017) to ensure that ‘sheltered’ sectors and the public sector follow 
the lead. Procedural mechanisms ensure consistency between agreements at different levels (Stokke 
2008). In the Nordic countries in general, and Sweden and Denmark in particular, Dølvik and co-
authors note that ‘the setting of actual pay, including local increments and other conditions, is 
increasingly delegated to company-level negotiations’ (Dølvik et al., 2018:12). Dale-Olsen et al. 
(2019) document the increased prevalence of local bargaining in parts of the private sector previously 
dominated by sectoral negotiations, and even in the public sector. The Norwegian pattern bargaining 
system has been under strain because of an expanding public sector and high wage drift among white-
collar workers in the private sector. To bolster the norm-setting effect of pattern-setting, white-collar 
wage growth was included in the export sector ‘norm’ (Müller et al., 2018), thereby meeting some of 
the criticism from female-dominated professional unions in the public sector. However, ample room 
for flexible wage-setting at firm level remains (Müller et al., 2018). 
While there is flexibility in wage-setting at firm level, the centralized bargaining structure, 
combined with single-channel representation in a two-tiered bargaining system (Stokke, 2008; 
Nergaard, 2014), means that decisions at the central level will influence priorities and activities at 
local level. Norway has no tradition of ‘opening clauses’, meaning that local unions cannot go below 
rates set in the sectoral agreements. 
In contrast to the UK, union density and union structures in Norway have been relatively 
stable for many decades, although (as in other Scandinavian countries) both density and bargaining 
coverage are gradually declining (Nergaard et al., 2015). Norway is also notable for the degree of 
gender equality in the social, political and economic domains, with unions to the fore in promoting it 
(Paraskevopoulou and McKay, 2015). Gender equality issues have become more important for 
Norwegian unions, especially in the powerful and traditionally male dominated blue collar 
confederation LO (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge), which was seen as lagging behind. Today a 
majority of LO members are women, and the number of women in top positions has increased 
substantially over time (Nergaard et al., 2013). There are only minor differences between men and 
women in terms of union office at company level: the 2016 working environment survey (LKU, 2016) 
showed that 16 percent of male members and 15 percent of female members currently held a union 
office or had done during the previous three years.  By the end of 2018, 7 of the 15 members of the 
LO Executive Board were women. One example of the emphasis given to gender equality issues is the 
introduction in the 2010 bargaining round of a duty for the parties at company level to review pay 
differences between women and men and to remedy any that cannot be justified. 
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The centralized bargaining system in Norway does appear to benefit women, and it may do so 
at local level, even if the local union is male-dominated. For example, most central agreements 
provide increments for low-wage workers in order to promote gender equality However, the 
bargaining orientation of a local union might also reflect the gender composition of its membership, 
as we might anticipate in the wholly decentralized bargaining system in the UK.  
 
 
Previous literature 
 
The union wage premium literature is dominated by studies of Anglophone countries. It has 
traditionally focused on membership as its preferred measure of union presence, partly for pragmatic 
reasons since most household surveys used to estimate the premium lack other measures. This is not 
usually thought to be a big problem since other measures tend to be strongly positively correlated with 
membership. Recent contributions to this literature have suggested that there has been a slow, small 
secular decline in the union membership wage premium (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2007; Brown et 
al., 2009). Some have suggested this reflects declining union bargaining power with the 
intensification of product market competition, often from non-unionized producers. Falling union 
membership is also thought to affect employer responses to union wage claims, because the ability to 
monopolize the supply of labour to the employer falls with declining membership. 
Much of the literature is confined to union effects in the private sector, in part because interest 
lies in how unions affect wages which would otherwise be set by the market. However, the public 
sector is heavily unionized; indeed, in Britain public sector workers constitute the majority of union 
members (Appendix Figure A2a). In Norway the public sector accounts for about half of all union 
members, a situation that has been roughly constant since the mid-1990s (Appendix Figure A2b). It 
therefore makes sense to compare and contrast union effects on wages across the whole economy. 
One of the few studies in Britain to do so found union membership wage effects were substantially 
higher in the public than in the private sector, perhaps because union strength in the sector and the 
absence of overt product competition make it easier for unions to capture rents (Blanchflower and 
Bryson, 2010). 
Union wage-setting has the capacity to increase gender equality by driving out discriminatory 
employer behaviour and by attaching wage rates to jobs rather than workers (Flanders, 1970; Slichter 
et al., 1960). This is what Flanders (1961) termed the ‘sword of justice’ effect. Using data for 1998, 
Metcalf et al. (2001: 72) confirm that unions in Britain narrowed gender differentials by delivering a 
much higher union wage premium for women than for men. Other studies for Britain also find unions 
have a bigger positive effect on wages for women than for men (Harkness, 1996).  
However, some studies for Britain reach different conclusions. Millward and Woodland 
(1995) find unions only increased men's pay and that this effect occurred only where there was strong 
workplace organization. The inconsistency in previous studies may partly reflect differences in data 
sets, the measures of unionization and model specifications. It is also possible that union effects may 
have changed since these studies were conducted, given the changes in the gender composition of the 
union and non-union sectors noted above. Blanchflower and Bryson (2010) estimate trends in the 
union wage premium by gender in the public and private sectors for the periods 1993-1999 and 2000-
2006. They find the union wage premium for women is larger than that for men in both sectors in both 
periods. For both sexes the premium is roughly constant in the public sector but falls in the private 
sector. 
For the USA, Rosenfeld (2014: 72-73) found the private sector union wage premium was 
persistently higher for men than for women over the period 1973-2009. Furthermore, the premium 
remained constant for men but declined for women. Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) also found that 
the wage premium in the USA was slightly higher among women in the 1970s compared to men but 
that the premium had fallen markedly for women by the 1990s. However, the situation was quite 
different in the public sector: throughout the 1980s and 1990s the union membership wage premium 
stood at around 10 percent for men compared to 16-17 percent for women.  
The Norwegian literature is limited, with no evidence on trends in union wage premia by 
sector and gender. Using manufacturing workplace data, Balsvik and Sæthre (2014) identify an 
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average union density wage premium effect of 6.7 percent for 1996-2007 (when density increases by 
10 percentage points wages increase by 0.67 percent). Similar figures were found by Barth et al. 
(2000) on 1989 survey data. This latter study also exploits individual-level data, finding no individual 
union membership effect when taking density into consideration, indicating that the union wage effect 
is a pure public good.  
There are several difficulties interpreting wage gaps between union members and non-
members as a premium attributable to union activities. In both Britain and Norway employees choose 
whether or not to be a union member and may do so based on their assessments of the costs and 
benefits. Unobserved factors correlated with both membership and wages will result in an upward bias 
in estimates of a union wage premium. If selection on unobservables differs across men and women it 
is not possible to assert that any gender differentials in the union wage premium based on OLS 
estimates capture the causal impact of unions. One example is safety, which Donaldo and Walde 
(2012) identify as a key topic for unions. Evidence suggests that women are more risk-averse than 
men (Borghans et al., 2009); hence they might value the insurance component of the union good more 
than men, increasing their relative propensity to unionize, and perhaps to trade higher wages for 
greater certitude. Recent laboratory and field research on gender differences in bargaining also reveal 
that women may be less successful negotiators, both when it comes to initiating negotiations (Bowles 
et al., 2005) and for outcomes (Artz et al., 2016). This may affect their propensity to unionize and the 
outcomes of negotiations in male and female-dominated union settings. Although women are thought 
to be more altruistic and oriented towards cooperation, the empirical evidence on this in the 
experimental literature is mixed and ambiguous.   
Female-dominated unions could give priority to family-friendly company policies and to a 
lesser extent focus on money wages. This notion is reasonable if female workers are also the primary 
carer at home. Previous research has not identified family-friendly fringe benefits as particularly 
prevalent in Norway, with two exceptions: flexible work hours contracts (Nergaard et al., 2018), 
which more men than women are able to exploit; and working from home. Jenssen and Schøne (2007) 
find that women with small children are much more likely than similar male workers to be employed 
in workplaces where employers provide a kindergarten, house cleaning services and working from 
home.  
Finally, the union wage gap could potentially follow from individual worker sorting and 
selection, with union and non-union workers differing individually in productivity. If this is the case, 
both regressions of individual union membership and union density might reveal significant 
correlations. A priori, however, the direction of selection is not clear. We account for some of this 
bias using linked employer-employee data containing rich workplace covariates and, for both Britain 
and Norway, we can account for bias associated with workplace fixed unobservable traits by 
estimating workplace fixed effects models where our data contain multiple employee observations per 
workplace. We ignore the potential endogeneity of union membership and union density, and simply 
present conditional associations, as is common in the literature. In the Norwegian case, we take into 
account bias from individual productivity differences by incorporating fixed individual effects. 
 
 
Data and empirical approach 
 
Data 
 
We use the British Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) 2004 and 2011 and linked 
employer-employee register data for 1995-2012 (for active jobs May 15th each year) from Statistics 
Norway. We focus on 2004 and 2011 for comparison purposes. The analyses presented below are 
confined to employees in workplaces with at least 5 employees, the lower threshold for inclusion in 
WERS. Information in WERS was acquired through face-to-face interviews and the response rate was 
64 percent.    
We identify union wage effects using two measures of unionization. The first is individual 
membership status (1=union member, 0=non-member), obtained via an employee survey in WERS 
while in Norway the data are taken from an administrative register. Our second measure is workplace 
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union density, often viewed as a useful proxy for bargaining power. Even when several unions 
bargain separately at a workplace, density will provide a joint proxy for unionization and bargaining 
power although it might overestimate each union’s bargaining power. In WERS the density measure 
is derived from questions asked of the HR Manager whereas in Norway it is derived from 
administrative data.  
Our wage equations estimate log hourly wages at individual employee level, after dropping 
outliers (the top and bottom 1 percent of earners). WERS does not collect continuous data on wages; 
instead it asks employees to categorize their gross weekly earnings into one of 14 bands ranging from 
‘less than £60 per week/£3120 per year’ to ‘£1051 or more per week/£54601 per year’. There is no 
explicit instruction to respondents whether to include performance payments, and since respondents 
may not have annual bonuses in mind when making the calculation, this measure may understate 
earnings variance associated with performance pay. To obtain a continuous measure of gross hourly 
earnings the convention is to take the mid-point of the respondent’s earnings band and divide this by 
the survey’s continuous measure of hours worked (which includes overtime). It is also conventional to 
top-code those in the top category, which has no ceiling, using an earnings figure that is 1.5 times the 
lower bound of this top category. We check whether these procedures introduce error into the 
dependent variable by imputing earnings within the bands using wage data from the Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (a random sample of 1 per cent of all employees in Britain for which employers 
are required by law to provide information based on payroll records). A comparison of imputed gross 
hourly earnings based on the conventional approach with those based on this survey indicates a 
correlation of 0.99.  
The Norwegian hourly wage measure is calculated for all active jobs on May 15th each year as 
reported to the tax authorities.  The earnings for the period spanning May 15th are divided by the 
contracted weekly working hours multiplied by the number of weeks employed to obtain the hourly 
rate. This measure comprises all wages, sick pay and taxable fringe benefits. To ease interpretation, 
we derive the equivalent monetary values by using the NOK-pound average yearly currency rates for 
2004 and 2011. 
 
 
Empirical approach 
 
We examine union effects on individual wages. The analysis for Britain is weighted for the inverse of 
the probability that the employee will be sampled and standard errors are clustered at workplace level 
to account for the non-independence of observations. The analysis for Norway is based on population 
data so weights and clustering are unnecessary. 
First, we present the raw member/non-member log hourly wage gap in 2003/4 and 2011/12. 
Then we recover a regression-adjusted gap conditioned on traits that are standard in the literature: 
individual (age and education), job (occupation, hours and tenure) and workplace (industry, size and 
location). Then we present a workplace fixed-effects model identifying the differential between 
observationally equivalent workers at the same workplace, having accounted for fixed unobservable 
traits of the workplace. For Norway only we draw on panel linked employer-employee data to 
estimate the effects of changes in individual union membership and changes in workplace union 
density on wages.  
All analyses are run separately by gender for the whole economy (separate analyses for the 
private sector only yield qualitatively similar results and are available from the authors upon request).  
 
 
Results 
 
Appendix Table A2 presents descriptive information on union membership rates in Britain and 
Norway. In both countries the percentage of employees who are union members is roughly constant 
over time, in both the private and public sectors, with density considerably higher in the public sector 
(three times in Britain and around twice in Norway). The stability in union density in Britain contrasts 
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with the remarkable rate of union decline experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. Unionization rates are 
much higher in Norway than in Britain, in both the public and private sectors.  
Very few Norwegian workplaces have no union members, whereas in Britain over 40 percent 
have no members, rising to 60 percent in the private sector. Whereas around a quarter of workplaces 
in Britain have density of 50 percent or more, this is the case in nearly two-thirds of workplaces in 
Norway (and almost 100 percent in the public sector). These union membership distributions across 
workplaces are fairly stable over the period. 
 Table 1a presents the union membership wage premium in Britain for the whole economy, for 
women and men separately. Among women the raw hourly wage gap between members and non-
members is around 0.2 log points and does not vary much over time. Much of this raw differential is 
accounted for by observable demographic, job and workplace traits but a sizeable and statistically 
significant union wage premium persists. The premium is 0.06 log points in 2004 and a little higher in 
2011. Women's wages do not rise with union density. 
 
[Table 1a about here] 
 
For men, once controls are introduced there is no evidence of a union wage premium, either 
in 2004 or 2011. Even the raw membership wage gap apparent in 2004 disappeared by 2011. 
However, in contrast to women, men’s wages rise with union density, albeit non-monotonically, an 
effect that is stronger in 2011 than it was in 2004. These results are replicated when we confine the 
analysis to the private sector. The effects are quantitatively large. For example, in the whole economy 
model, those men with 100 per cent union membership at their workplace earned 0.14 log points more 
than an observationally equivalent man in a workplace with no union members. 
One worry regarding these results is that they are driven by public sector pay setting. Thus, 
we have also conducted similar analyses for the private sector only. A premium of a similar size is 
apparent, although the fixed-effects estimate for 2011 is somewhat smaller and non-significant (0.03 
log points); full results are available from the authors on request. However, in both the whole 
economy and the private sector, women’s wages do not rise with workplace union density. 
The implications from the British analysis by gender are the following. First, and 
unexpectedly, there is little evidence of positive selection into union membership among men on 
observable traits, certainly by 2011, whereas it is very evident among women, as indicated by the 
reduction in the size of the raw wage gap when controls are added to the model. Second, there is a 
substantial and persistent union wage premium in Britain, but it is confined to women. This is the case 
in whole economy and private sector estimates. Third, only men benefit from higher union density. 
One possible interpretation of this union density effect is that unions use their bargaining power at the 
workplace to deliver wage increases for men, but not for women. Women do benefit, on average, 
from their membership since they receive a wage premium, but there is no additional benefit arising 
from the additional bargaining power with higher density. The fact that the union membership wage 
premium is confined to women is consistent with unions maximizing their members' benefits 
according to a median voter model, although we can not discount the possibility that union 
membership may be picking up the effects of women's unobservable traits that are correlated both 
with union membership and wages. The fact that increasing union density does not benefit women 
runs counter to the proposition that unions will use higher bargaining power to deliver greater benefits 
to their median voters, namely women. 
Since bargaining takes place at the workplace level, a precise test of the median voter 
proposition requires information on the gender split of union members by workplace to distinguish 
majority male and majority female unions. WERS does not collect these data for all workplaces. 
However, we can identify circumstances in which the majority of union members are female at the 
workplace using membership data from the subset of employees who return an employee 
questionnaire. To minimize measurement error we run analyses for the subset of employees where all 
employees at the workplace submitted a questionnaire return. We pooled data for both years, given 
the low estimation sample (826 observations in 93 workplaces). This confirmed that, conditioning on 
individual union membership, women only received a wage premium associated with union density 
when a majority of union members were women. This premium was .44 log points raw (t=2.78) and 
.26 log points (t=1.67) conditioning on demographic and workplace characteristics. In the private 
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sector the figures were .55 log points raw (t=3.31) and .35 log points (t=2.06) with controls. However, 
this is an imperfect test given the non-random nature of this estimation sample. 
In Norway, the raw gap between union members and non-members is substantial among 
women but the regression-adjusted differential is negligible: in 2004 it is 0.01 log points but by 2011 
it has become zero (Table 1b). Among men a sizeable raw wage premium disappears with the addition 
of controls: men faced a union wage penalty of 0.02 log points in 2004 and no significant effect in 
2011 (Table 2b). The individual union wage premia in 2011 are clearly not different for men and 
women, and the negative male premium in 2004 could be associated with 2003 being a bad year for 
the male-dominated export industries. However, and in contrast to Britain, the wages of both men and 
women rise substantially in workplaces with higher union density. In both cases this effect strengthens 
between 2004 and 2011. In the private sector the individual membership premium for both men and 
women was .55 log points raw (t=3.31) and .35 log points (t=2.06) with controls.  
 
[Table 1b about here] 
 
Both Britain and Norway face the challenge of gender labour market segregation, with 
Norway having slightly greater segregation than Britain (European Commission, 2009). One aspect of 
this is segregation across workplaces. Table 2 abstracts away from this by estimating the union wage 
returns for members in the same workplace based on workplace fixed effects models. These indicate a 
sizeable union membership premium for women only in Britain, whereas in Norway there is no 
significant effect of individual union membership for women's wages while male union members 
suffer a negligible wage penalty relative to their non-member counterparts, but only for 2004. The 
similarity between the OLS and workplace fixed effects models in the British and Norwegian analyses 
suggests that worker selection across workplaces plays little role in the determination of the union 
wage premium in either country. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
For Norway only we are able to draw on panel linked employer-employee data to estimate the 
effects of changes in individual union membership and changes in workplace-level union density on 
employees' wages, and we can also identify whether unions are male-dominated or female-dominated. 
The results, presented in Table 3, indicate that women earn considerably less than men in the same 
workplace, but that this effect is ameliorated a little by being a union member, as indicated by the 
positive coefficient on the interaction between membership and being a woman in the first four 
columns. In workplaces where the union is female-dominated (column 3) women benefit more than 
men from the increased bargaining power of the union as union density rises. Where the union is 
male-dominated (column 4) men and women both benefit to a similar degree from rising union 
density (although there is a small negative premium for women where union density is under 75 
percent).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
One worry is that less productive workers would be more likely to join unions than more 
productive workers, to gain the protection associated with unions. The last four columns of Table 3 
examine union effects on workers who have switched union status over time, and thus where we are 
able to completely control away fixed individual productivity differentials. Both men and women 
benefit from individual union membership under male-dominated unions only (column 4 vs column 
3). However, where the union is female-dominated, increasing union density has a disproportionately 
large positive effect on women's wages, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant 
interaction terms in the penultimate column in Table 3. Men do not benefit in a similar fashion from 
male-dominated unionized workplaces (final column), where both men and women receive the same 
benefits from increasing union density. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
 
Using nationally representative linked employer-employee data for Britain and Norway over the 
period 2003-2012, we find that in Britain there is a union wage premium of 6-7 percent for women 
but no premium for men. These findings are apparent in estimates for both the whole economy and 
the private sector only. However, higher union density only raises men's wages, not women's. Thus, in 
Britain, although women appear to benefit from their investment in union membership, there are no 
additional returns to being in a workplace where union bargaining power is strengthened through high 
density, raising questions about the extent to which unions are focused on using their organizational 
strength to tackle gender wage inequality.  
Consistent with earlier research, for Norway we find little or no wage premium associated 
with individual union membership. Indeed, men experienced a small wage penalty of 1-2 percent in 
2004, while women obtained a small premium of 1-2 percent, but for both this disappeared in 2011. 
Furthermore, albeit significant, the correlations in 2004 are economically minor, and are only 
significant due to the large number of observations. Still, these correlations could also reflect sorting 
and selection effects yielding productivity differentials, which then show up as premia or penalties. 
However, wages of both men and women rise substantially in workplaces with higher density 
in Norway, consistent with the idea that union efforts to raise wages at workplace level result in a 
public good. Furthermore, the returns from increasing union density are larger for women than for 
men when the union is female-dominated, a finding that is consistent with the median voter model. 
This could indicate that although central agreements contain gender equality provisions, local support 
is still important.  
The median voter model receives only limited support in Britain: only women receive a union 
membership wage premium and, in the small unrepresentative sample where we observe the gender 
composition of the union, women see their wages rise with union density. However, in general only 
men benefit from higher density, despite women being the median voters. The returns to union density 
are more equitably distributed in Norwegian workplaces where the union is male-dominated, perhaps 
reflecting unions' desire to address gender equity issues at the workplace. Furthermore, where unions 
are female-dominated, the wage premium attached to higher density is greater for women than for 
men, consistent with the median voter model. The findings might be interpreted as supporting claims 
made in the past that British unions adopt a paternalistic attitude to their membership. The results for 
Norway might be interpreted in quite a different way, as supporting the contention that unions there 
adopt a more progressive stance on gender, since higher union bargaining power at workplace level, 
as indicated by union density, benefits both men and women.  
It is not only in Norway and Britain that women constitute an increasing proportion of union 
members. Unions across Europe face the challenge of servicing this new membership base and these 
members’ preferences. The experience in Norway, in particular, may be good news for women since 
it appears that female-dominated unions are of particular benefit to women and may be able to play a 
particularly strong role in combatting the gender wage gap. However, reductions in union membership 
in many European countries will limit unions’ ability to influence wage bargaining, potentially 
increasing gender wage inequality. 
There are some important caveats to these tentative conclusions, however. First, this might 
change in the future. Women started dominating unions roughly ten years later in the UK than in 
Norway. Since it takes time for bargaining priorities to change, the apparently more egalitarian 
attitudes of Norwegian unions could just reflect their becoming female-dominated earlier. Second, we 
have concentrated solely on bargaining over wages. Other recent research for the UK suggests that 
unions have played an important role in securing better non-wage terms and conditions that are valued 
highly by women. Our focus therefore provides only a partial picture regarding unions’ ability to 
deliver for female members, especially if there are gender differences in preferences for non-wage 
amenities. It is also worth recalling that women (like men) benefit in terms of both wage and non-
wage benefits from employment in unionized workplaces, whether they are members or not, so they 
can benefit from the provision of union-generated public goods which they would not otherwise be 
able to obtain. 
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Table 1a. Female and male union wage premium whole economy. Britain. OLS.  
 
Female Male 
 
No controls Controls No controls Controls 
 2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011 
Member 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.03 0.02 0.00 
 
(13.79) (9.42) (6.20) (6.49) (3.98) (-1.23) (1.40) (-0.02) 
Workplace union density (ref: 0%) 
      1-24% 
  
0.01 0 
  
0.03 0.09*** 
   
(0.77) (0.03) 
  
(1.50) (3.82) 
25-49% 
  
-0.01 0.01 
  
-0.01 0.05 
   
(-0.37) (0.48) 
  
(-0.41) (1.49) 
50-74% 
  
0.02 0.03 
  
0.05** 0.12*** 
   
(1.00) (1.18) 
  
(2.04) (4.01) 
75-99% 
  
0.02 0.02 
  
0.06** 0.11*** 
   
(0.99) (0.72) 
  
(2.49) (3.71) 
100% 
  
0.05 0.02 
  
0.03 0.14*** 
   
(1.39) (0.43) 
  
(0.36) (3.88) 
r2 0.05 0.03 0.54 0.53 0.01 0 0.59 0.62 
N 11165 10888 10974 10668 9809 8640 9682 8460 
Controls: age (6 dummies); highest qualification (8 dummies); workplace tenure (5 dummies); usual 
weekly hours (5 dummies).  
OLS workplace controls: 2-digit industry; located in capital city; N employees; N employees squared; 
2-digit occupation; union density (7 dummies). t-statistics in parentheses.  
Significance tests: * 90% ** 95% *** 99% 
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Table 1b. Female and male union wage premium whole economy. Norway. OLS. 
 
Female Male 
 
No controls Controls No controls Controls 
 2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011 
Member 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.01*** -0.00 0.12*** 0.17*** 
-
0.02*** -0.00 
 
(52.52) (60.46) (5.16) (-1.44) (17.08) (23.59) (-5.80) (-1.36) 
Workplace union density (ref: 0%) 
      1-24% 
  
0.02*** 0.06*** 
  
0.04*** 0.08*** 
   
(3.91) (9.46) 
  
(7.10) (13.95) 
25-49% 
  
0.09*** 0.14*** 
  
0.08*** 0.15*** 
   
(14.04) (20.11) 
  
(8.70) (21.10) 
50-74% 
  
0.16*** 0.23** 
  
0.10*** 0.17*** 
   
(26.04) (34.86) 
  
(13.50) (21.32) 
75-99% 
  
0.15*** 0.23*** 
  
0.12*** 0.18*** 
   
(22.95) (29.67) 
  
(13.91) (18.72) 
100% 
  
0.12*** 0.18*** 
  
0.13*** 0.22*** 
   
(17.84) (24.62) 
  
(13.62) (24.37) 
r2 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.30 0.30 
N 880009 1003065 880009 1003065 907684 1043414 907684 1043414 
Source: Norwegian tax authorities’ employment registers.  
See Table 1a on controls. 
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Table 2: Female and male union wage premium whole economy. Britain and Norway. 
Workplace fixed effects with controls. 
 
Britain Norway 
 
Female 
2004 
Female 
2011 
Male 
2004 
Male 
2011 
Female 
2004 
Female 
2011 
Male 
2004 
Male 
2011 
Member 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*** 
 
(5.72) (4.70) (-0.10) (-0.13) (8.60) (-1.84) (-5.89) (-4.94) 
r2 0.67 0.66 0.73 0.76 0.35 0.45 0.47 0.51 
N 10974 10668 9682 8460 880009 1003065 907684 1043414 
Notes: see Table 1a and b. 
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Table 3: Female and male union wage premium whole economy. Norway.  
 
Within workplace (Workplace FE) Within individual (Worker FE) 
 
No Union 
density  
Union 
density 
Female 
dominated  
Male 
dominated  
No Union 
density  
Union 
density 
Female 
dominated  
Male 
dominated  
Woman -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14***     
 (-87.45) (-46.23) (-45.70) (-44.40)     
Member -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.02*** 
 
(-5.47) (-2.65) (-5.96) (-3.73) (17.63) (6.21) (0.94) (4.03) 
WomanX 
Member 
0.02*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.01 
(8.16) (1.76) (6.51) (7.16) (-4.84) (-7.49) (-0.25) (-0.83) 
       
Workplace union density (ref: 0%) 
      1-24% 
 
-0.02*** -0.04*** -0.01** 
 
0.01** -0.01 0.01** 
  
(4.71) (-5.34) (-2.45) 
 
(2.22) (-0.84) (2.23) 
25-49% 
 
-0.02*** -0.05*** -0.00 
 
0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
  
(2.56) (-3.40) (-0.37) 
 
(11.41) (5.45) (8.04) 
50-74% 
 
-0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
 
0.14** 0.16*** 0.11*** 
  
(1.45) (-3.31) (1.02) 
 
(23.78) (14.00) (14.99) 
75-99% 
 
-0.01 -0.04*** 0.02 
 
0.15*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 
  
(1.10) (-2.62) (1.35) 
 
(23.01) (14.01) (13.93) 
100% 
 
0.00 -0.02 0.02 
 
0.16*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 
  
(0.01) (-1.46) (1.52) 
 
(19.12) (11.00) (11.46) 
WomanX 
1-24% 
 -0.00 0.01** -0.01***  -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (1.15) (2.23) (-3.35)  (-0.35) (0.52) (0.46) 
WomanX 
25-49% 
 0.01 0.04*** -0.03***  0.04*** 0.06*** 0.00 
 (1.43) (8.48) (-5.22)  (4.66) (4.33) (0.38) 
WomanX 
50-74% 
 0.03*** 0.06*** -0.01***  0.08*** 0.09*** 0.01 
 (7.07) (10.25) (-2.62)  (11.14) (6.85) (0.52) 
WomanX 
75-99% 
 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.01  0.09*** 0.10*** 0.00 
 (8.41) ( 9.78) (-1.31)  (10.41) (7.64) (0.17) 
WomanX 
100% 
 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.01  0.08*** 0.10*** -0.00 
 (6.34) ( 7.59) (-1.46)  (8.24) (6.54) (-0.20) 
r2 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.91 
N 3834172 3834172 2207218 1986420 3834172 3834172 2207218 1986420 
Source: Norwegian tax authorities’ employment registers.  
See Table 1a on controls. 
